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1. Introduction
There is widespread concern that people are not
saving enough for their retirement. Occupational
pension schemes are an important mechanism by
which retirement saving can be rendered automat-
ic and as such have been encouraged via tax con-
cessions in many countries. Many occupational
pensions, in both the UK and elsewhere, have
taken the form of defined benefit (DB) final salary
plans. However, new regulatory requirements and
demographic changes have significantly raised the
costs of such schemes. As a result, many UK com-
panies have been closing their DB schemes to new
(and sometimes to existing) members and replac-
ing them with less generous defined contribution
(DC) plans.1 Public awareness and concern over
the adequacy of retirement saving has never been
higher, as illustrated by the words ‘pension crisis’
being used 1,104 times in UK newspapers in 2005
compared to only 19 times in 1999 (Hillman,
2008: 9).
This paper addresses the issue of whether the
switch from DB to DC plans that has occurred in
both the UK and the US can be attributable, at least
in part, to changes in the rules governing the re-
porting of DB plans in companies’ published fi-
nancial statements. Pinning down the influence of
accounting requirements on pension provision is
not straightforward. The cash contributions re-
quired of employers to support their DB schemes
have increased markedly. This alone might be ex-
pected to have played a decisive role in the decline
of DB schemes. Indeed, it could be argued that ac-
counting is doing its job properly when it reveals
to managers and owners the costs and risks in-
volved in offering DB pensions, and this might
reasonably be expected to result in changes in pen-
sion provision. Furthermore, there is only a small
body of rigorous academic research that directly
addresses the relationship between pension ac-
counting rules and pension provision. The results
of some studies are only in working paper form
and have not yet been subject to academic peer re-
view. For these reasons, our survey of the field
covers a variety of sources, both academic and
non-academic, and embeds them in a wider discus-
sion of the factors influencing pension provision.
Our review of the research literature reveals that
while DB pension provision has undoubtedly de-
clined, there have been many factors other than
new accounting requirements that have played a
part in this change. Nevertheless, there is clearly a
widespread perception that changes in pension ac-
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counting standards that result in increased volatil-
ity in reported earnings and the incorporation of
pension surpluses and deficits on the balance sheet
will lead firms either to change pension investment
strategy or to close or restrict their DB schemes.
The studies that have been undertaken to date of
decisions to freeze, terminate or convert DB plans
suggest that the desire to limit cash contributions
has been the major determinant, though financial
reporting has played a part as well. The picture is
clearer in the case of post-retirement health care
provision in the US where regulatory interventions
do not muddy the water. The evidence suggests
that the introduction of accrual accounting has led
to firms cutting benefits. Research also clearly
demonstrates that changes in accounting for DB
schemes have affected how firms allocate pension
plan assets.
The remainder of the paper is organised as fol-
lows. Section 2 briefly outlines some of the main
changes that have taken place in pension provision
and the key factors that have driven these changes.
Section 3 summarises the relevant key issues at
stake in pension accounting and then outlines the
main features of the responses received by the
Accounting Standards Board (ASB) to its various
proposals insofar as they bear on possible conse-
quences for pension provision. We review in
Section 4 the academic research dealing with why
firms have terminated, frozen or converted their
DB plans with special reference to the effect that
accounting might have had in encouraging or dis-
couraging such changes. Section 5 examines re-
search dealing with the impact of accounting on
another form of retirement provision, post-retire-
ment health care. Accounting can affect not only
the nature of the benefits offered to employees, but
also the way in which pension funds are invested,
an issue we address in Section 6. Concluding re-
marks appear in Section 7.
2. Changes in corporate pension provision
Private-sector pension provision has changed over
the years. In 1953 only three million people in
Britain were members of private-sector occupa-
tional pension schemes, and this had risen to more
than eight million by 1967, growth facilitated by
increases in marginal tax rates and wage controls
that constrained wages but not pension benefits
(Pensions Commission, 2005: 122). DB plans ac-
counted for only 23% of all pension funds in 1953;
this had risen to 92% in 1979, after which the trend
reversed. While DB plans continue to be very im-
portant – the majority of employees covered by
private-sector schemes are enrolled in DB plans –
their importance is declining; a large share of these
DB schemes are closed to new members.2 A simi-
lar picture of DB plans continuing to decline in im-
portance relative to DC plans can be found in the
US (US Department of Labor, 2007).
Private-sector DB pension schemes are clearly
less common than they were. To understand why
this happened we need to consider the risks that
DB plans pose for employers. These comprise:
1. Longevity risk: the risk that employees will, on
average, live longer than predicted.
2. Interest rate risk: the risk that interest rates will
fall and the burden of long-dated liabilities in-
crease accordingly.
3. Inflation risk: the risk that final salaries will in-
crease at a rate greater than predicted.
4. Investment return risk: the risk that the returns
on the employers’ contributions to the plan will
under-perform.
Employers can mitigate these risks in a variety
of ways, including fully funding or overfunding
their plans, and by encouraging the trustees to
adopt asset portfolio allocation strategies which
hedge the liabilities. We address the question of
whether accounting standards have affected pen-
sion asset allocation decisions later in Section 6.
While the risks DB plans pose for employers are
not new, nevertheless the risks have been in-
creased in recent years by regulatory changes in
the UK designed to deal with three major risks that
DB pensions posed for employees:
1. Employment risk: the risk that the employee
will lose or change jobs. In some jurisdictions,
short-service employees can find themselves in
the situation where the accumulated value of
their own contributions into the DB plans they
have at their various employers exceeds the
present value of the pension rights they had ac-
crued (Monks and Minow, 2008: 145).
2. Inflation risk: the risk of pension purchasing
power being eroded by inflation.
3. Default risk: the moral hazard that employers
will default on their obligations, either by be-
coming insolvent or by closing the plan at a
later date to existing members at an age when
they might be too old to build up equivalent DC
pensions.
A number of regulatory changes have been intro-
duced to mitigate these employee risks. In the UK,
these include: preservation of the benefits of early
leavers (1988); inflation protection (1991); the in-
256 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
2 As at March 2007, 61% of schemes monitored by the
Pensions Regulator were closed either to new members or to
future accruals, although the proportion of schemes still open
to new members was much greater for larger schemes
(Pensions Regulator, 2007: 16). See also Government
Actuary’s Department (2006) and Cebula and Reyes De-
Beaman (2004).
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troduction of a minimum funding requirement
(1997), replaced since 2005 by a risk-based levy
pension protection scheme, with an accompanying
need to notify the regulator of certain events (such
as changes in credit rating, changes of ownership
and breaches of loan covenants). Such regulatory
impositions have inevitably increased the cost and
reduced the attractiveness of DB plans to UK em-
ployers, regardless of accounting requirements.
Regulatory changes regarding pension provision
have occurred in other countries, some of which
are similar in scope and effect as those that have
taken place in the UK and some of which are dif-
ferent. These factors need to be borne in mind
when considering studies about the impact of pen-
sion accounting rules on pension provision in dif-
ferent countries. We refer to these, as appropriate,
when discussing the evidence in subsequent sec-
tions.
At an aggregate level, DC plans undoubtedly are
cheaper for employers than DB plans. For exam-
ple, the employer’s contribution in 2005 as a pro-
portion of the employee’s salary averaged 16% for
DB schemes and only 6.3% for DC schemes
(Government Actuary’s Department, 2006: 94).
However, care needs to be taken in interpreting
these figures. Pension arrangements are but one
part of an employment package. Employees with
DB pensions might have very different bargaining
power than those with DC pensions, making sim-
ple comparisons between the two forms of pension
provision misleading. If the sole objective of a
firm in moving from a DB plan to a DC one is to
reduce payroll costs, this can be done in a variety
of ways that need not entail terminating their DB
plans.3 The simplest way would be to require the
employees to make greater contributions, or to re-
duce pension benefits (e.g. by cutting the accrual
rate), or by cutting some other component of the
pay package.4 The major drawback of DB schemes
nowadays is that they expose the employer to
volatile demands for cash injections.5 Another
drawback of DB schemes that has been raised in
various quarters is that recent changes in pension
accounting rules have also increased the volatility
of pension expense reported in the profit and loss
statement.
With this general picture in mind, we turn next
to considering the question of how pension ac-
counting has changed and the likely consequences.
3. The accounting changes and the 
reactions to them
Until comparatively recently, UK companies had a
free hand in how they accounted for their DB
schemes. No real distinction was drawn between
DB and DC plans, both being accounted for essen-
tially on a pay-as-you-go contributions basis. This
changed with the introduction of SSAP 24 (ASC,
1988), except that the calculation of DB pension
cost continued to be based on actuarial valuation
methods that had underpinned the pension funding
decisions. These methods allowed considerable
discretion in the calculation of pension asset val-
ues and liabilities. Assets were traditionally valued
by actuaries using a variety of prospective-yield
methods designed to iron out variations in market
prices. Liabilities were measured using a rate that
reflected the fund’s asset allocation strategy – the
more it invested in higher-yielding (and hence
more risky) assets, the higher the rate used to dis-
count the liabilities. In essence, SSAP 24 allowed
for an accrual method of determining pension ex-
pense that smoothed out pension surpluses and
deficits. In contrast, by requiring pension assets to
be measured at market value and pension liabilities
to be discounted using the yield on AA-rated cor-
porate bonds, FRS 17 (ASB, 2000) exposed to
public gaze the extent to which the employer had
surpluses or deficits in its DB plans. While compa-
nies were required as from 2001 to make disclo-
sures in the notes to their financial statements, full
implementation of FRS 17 was postponed until
2005 so as not to burden them with a change be-
fore the switch to International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS) required in that year.
Since that date, UK firms have had to recognise
their pension plan surpluses or deficits as an asset
or liability on their balance sheets and to record
any actuarial gains and losses in the statement of
total recognised gains and losses.
What was the expected effect of these changes
when they were introduced? To answer this ques-
tion, we provide a brief summary below of the
analysis we have carried out of relevant aspects of
the responses received by the ASB to three sets of
proposals it has issued at different times on pen-
sion accounting. This evidence has to be treated
with caution as individuals and organisations make
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 257
3 Insights into why DB plans have become more costly than
DC plans can be gleaned by considering the effect of an an-
nounced increase in life expectancy of employees and pen-
sioners. In the case of DC plans, the cost would be borne by
the employees and pensioners unless the employer increases
its contributions. In the case of DB plans, because the accrual
rate of pension benefits is usually defined by a pre-specified
formula, the cost would be borne by the employer, unless ei-
ther the accrual rate or any contributions required of the em-
ployees were changed.
4 It is worth noting in this regard that employees enrolled in
DB schemes, on average, do make larger proportionate contri-
butions than do those in DC schemes – 4.4% versus 2.7%
(Government Actuary’s Department, 2006: 94).
5 For example, the Pensions Regulator (2007: 70) certified
£9bn of special contributions to reduce deficits in 2007. In the
US, aggregate employer contributions increased from an aver-
age of about $30bn per year between 1980 and 2000 to $45bn
in 2001 and to $100bn in 2002 and 2003 (Buessing and Soto,
2006).
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such submissions with a view to influencing the
development of standards and as such the sample
inevitably suffers from selection bias.
The ASB received 137 letters in response to
FRED 20 (ASB, 1999), its proposed replacement
for SSAP 24. This response rate is far greater than
is usual for exposure drafts, reflecting the far-
reaching nature of the proposed changes (notably,
to switch from an actuarial to a market basis for
valuing assets and to include pension surpluses
and deficits on the balance sheet). Many respon-
dents expressed the fear that the proposals might
lead to the demise of DB plans. This concern was
widely shared across groups, including specialists
in the pension’s field (e.g. Institute and Faculty of
Actuaries, National Association of Pension Funds,
Pensions Management Institute, and various actu-
arial consulting firms) and accountants (e.g.
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland and
Midlands Group of Finance Directors). The pri-
mary reason cited was that the proposals would in-
crease the volatility of pension costs that would be
reported in the profit and loss statement and result
in large fluctuations in pension surpluses and
deficits included on the balance sheet. Some re-
spondents speculated that companies might alter
their pension investment strategies to counter this
increased volatility. Others thought that the prac-
tice of enhancing scheme benefits (especially in
respect of past service) might be jeopardised if
companies were required to recognise the costs
immediately rather than spreading them out over a
longer period.
Some respondents explained why they thought
these changes to financial reporting would have
such major effects on corporate behaviour. In
some cases the underlying unarticulated fear ap-
pears to be that the volatility FRED 20 would in-
troduce into financial statements would have
detrimental effects on share prices. This assumes,
of course, that the market was not already taking
into account companies’ pension exposures. There
is a considerable body of US research indicating
that share prices reflect firms’ off-balance sheet
pension surpluses and deficits and that the mar-
ket’s assessment of equity risk does reflect the risk
of the firm’s pension plans (Landsman, 1986; Jin
et al., 2006). On the other hand, Franzoni and
Marin (2006) present evidence of the market sig-
nificantly over-valuing firms with severely under-
funded pension plans, suggesting that while
investors took some account of pension exposures
afforded by SFAS 87 (FASB, 1985a) disclosures,
they did not fully incorporate into prices the nega-
tive impact of a large pension deficit on future
earnings and cash flows. It is hard to oppose
changes to accounting requirements if they are
likely to lead to better informed investors, even if
pension provision is affected as a result. Indeed,
some respondents expressed exactly this senti-
ment.
Some respondents were concerned that the
changes might constrain firms’ actions and this
might lead them to abandon their DB schemes. For
example, the Confederation of British Industry
voiced the concern that the inclusion of pension
deficits on the balance sheet might limit their abil-
ity to pay dividends. This is a situation where ac-
counting numbers serve to constrain managerial
actions, in addition to providing information for
investors. It could be argued that, if it is the case
that changes in pension accounting would restrict
the payment of dividends in an unintended and
harmful manner, the best solution would be to
amend the provisions of the company law govern-
ing distributions.
The response to the ASB’s proposed amendment
to FRS 17 and associated proposed disclosures
(ASB, 2006) was much more muted.6 Of the 44 
letters received, only one raised any questions
about the likely effect on pension provision. Legal
& General expressed the view that any require-
ment to disclose the buyout cost of DB schemes
would ‘… inevitably have a negative impact on
market perceptions of the employing companies,
leading to a further reduction in the appeal of de-
fined benefit schemes for employers’ on the
ground that the buyout cost would typically exceed
the FRS 17 liability. Though they outline why they
think the buyout cost is misleading, they treat it as
self-evident that its disclosure would confuse in-
vestors.
As part of the long-term review of pension ac-
counting being carried out by the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) the
ASB in conjunction with the European Financial
Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) issued a new
discussion paper on the subject (ASB, 2008)
which attracted 100 comment letters. Two sugges-
tions in the paper particularly concerned corre-
spondents:
• Replacement of the AA-rated corporate bond
yield with a risk-free rate to value pension lia-
bilities. Respondents worried that the resultant
increase in reported pension liabilities would in-
crease the incidence of deficits and this might
drive firms to invest in government bonds with
attendant increases in costs of pension provi-
sion.
• Use of the actual rate of return in place of the ex-
pected rate of return in the measurement of the
return on plan assets in the profit and loss state-
258 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
6 The proposed amendments were that FRS 17 disclosure
requirements should be replaced with those of IAS 19 and that
the buyout value of scheme liabilities should also be disclosed.
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ment. The resultant increase in earnings volatili-
ty would encourage firms to close their DB
plans.
A number of respondents commented negatively
on the recommendation in the discussion paper
that normal consolidation principles be applied
such that pension assets and liabilities should be
included in the employer’s balance sheet on a
‘gross’ rather than ‘net’ basis. It has been estimat-
ed by Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2008) that lever-
age ratios for firms with pension plans would be
about 35% higher in the US if pension assets and
liabilities are treated in this manner.
Our reading of the 281 comment letters submit-
ted to the ASB on pension accounting suggests
there is widespread concern that the changes in
pension accounting will cause firms to make sub-
optimal pension provision decisions driven by
short-term reporting considerations. We return to
this issue in Section 7.
Concerns over changes in pension accounting
requirements have not been restricted to the UK.
Of particular importance has been the debate sur-
rounding the move in the US from SFAS 87
(FASB, 1985a) to SFAS 158 (FASB, 2006) which
led to the elimination of the ‘corridor method’ and
the recognition of the funded status of the pension
plan on the balance sheet. The corridor method
provides a means of smoothing the impact of actu-
arial gains and losses on reported income.7 Under
SFAS 158, such gains and losses are recognised
immediately in other comprehensive income. As
SFAS 158 also requires the recognition of (the net
difference between) pension assets and liabilities
on the balance sheet, pension accounting has be-
come embroiled in the debate over whether fair
value accounting has contributed towards the cred-
it crunch (Moody’s Investor Service, 2008; Plantin
et al., 2008).
4. The impact of accounting on DB 
pension provision
No rigorous study has yet been carried out to de-
termine whether the introduction of FRS 17 caused
firms to terminate their DB plans. One study that
does touch on the issue is Klumpes et al. (2007),
which uses the pension footnote disclosures re-
quired under FRS 17 to identify 40 companies that
switched actuarial valuation methods to ones that
are similar to those required under FRS 17. This
sample was then matched by industry on a pair-
wise basis with 40 non-switching firms. Klumpes
et al. report that 33 of the 80 firms terminated their
plans and 47 did not. They found that termination
was more likely, the less well funded the pension
liabilities and the bigger the value of the put op-
tion, to default on those liabilities. In other words,
the financial condition of a DB plan plays an im-
portant part in whether or not it will be terminated.
Klumpes et al. also found that firms that had
switched to FRS 17-like actuarial methods were
less likely to terminate their DB plans, a result
they attribute to such firms tending to sponsor bet-
ter-funded schemes from a conservative, long-run
actuarial perspective.
A number of studies have been carried out in the
US into the factors that are likely to have influ-
enced decisions to terminate or freeze DB pension
plans in order to remove excess assets from over-
funded pension plans.8,9 This can be done in two
ways: all at once, by terminating the plan; or slow-
ly over time, by changing the actuarial assump-
tions that underpin the contributions required by
the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation.
Terminations are not costless. They have often
been bitterly contested by employee groups.
Terminations can damage a firm’s reputation if
they are seen as violating an implicit agreement to
provide a pension based on final salary that will in-
clude cost-of-living adjustments after retirement
financed from the excess assets.10 Mittelstaedt
(1989) and Thomas (1989) focused on plan termi-
nations during the first half of the 1980s, a time
(prior to the introduction of SFAS 87) when the ac-
counting rules discouraged rather than encouraged
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 259
7 It should be noted that the corridor method, at the time of
writing, is still required under international GAAP in IAS 19
(IASB, 2004).
8 Our review of the literature on termination of overfunded
DB plans is restricted to those which have a direct bearing on
pension accounting. Other studies have considered other fac-
tors behind these decisions. The general focus of these studies
has been to identify settings where the plans have been termi-
nated in order to transfer wealth from employees and pension-
ers to shareholders or to senior managers (Pontiff et al., 1990;
Petersen, 1992; Hamdallah and Ruland, 1986; VanDerhei,
1987; Mittelstaedt and Regier, 1990; Mitchell and Mulherin,
1989) or because of financing constraints (Stone, 1987, 1991)
or to minimise tax (Clinch and Shibano, 1996). We exclude
such studies from further consideration because they do not
address the issue of whether pension accounting rules stimu-
lated or constrained such termination decisions.
9 There are important institutional similarities and differ-
ences between the ways in which private sector pension 
provision in the US and UK are regulated. A proper documen-
tation of these similarities and differences is beyond the scope
of the present paper. We refer at various places to some of the
most important developments. For further details, see Fore
(2004), Sullivan (2004), McGill et al. (2005), Gordon (2005),
Walker and Haberman (2005), Byrne et al. (2006), Gordon
and Gallery (2008) and Klumpes and Tang (2007). See Barr
and Diamond (2008) for a general overview of pension sys-
tems in different countries.
10 It should be noted that the treatment of cost-of-living ad-
justments in pension schemes differs between the US and the
UK. As we already noted, in the UK, indexation is a legal re-
quirement introduced in 1991. In the US, it represents an 
implicit contract between the employer and the plan benefici-
aries. Bodie (1990: 27) points out: ‘The failure of pension
funds [in the US] to show any significant interest in inflation-
protected investment products such as CPI-linked bonds is
clear evidence that they do not view their liabilities as indexed
for inflation.’
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plan terminations by either requiring the gain be
amortised over at least ten years or be classified as
extraordinary income, depending on the circum-
stances (Thomas, 1989: 375).11 The research de-
signs differed, but both studies identify cash needs
as the primary determinant of termination deci-
sions. These cash needs arose from either a weak-
ening of financial performance or financial
restructuring following a hostile takeover.
Closure of overfunded pension plans can readily
be explained by firms seeking to secure their prop-
erty rights to excess assets. Likewise, termination
of underfunded schemes can be explained by firms
seeking to reduce their pension liabilities. These
incentives would exist, regardless of how pensions
are dealt with in financial statements. Indeed, one
can go further: plan terminations should be wealth-
neutral, if the actions were simply driven by a de-
sire to meet a financial reporting objective with no
contracting consequences. However, there is evi-
dence that plan terminations have real wealth ef-
fects. Haw et al. (1988) show that there is a
positive stock market reaction at the time of the
termination announcement, driven principally by
firms terminating overfunded plans tending to
have tax loss carry-forwards that can be exploited
by the termination.12 Hsieh at al. (1990) provide
evidence of abnormal returns when the terminat-
ing firms are experiencing financial distress. These
are powerful reasons for terminating plans that
owe little or nothing to how the accounting is
done.13
Nevertheless, there is some evidence that the
way pension expense was measured under SFAS
87 might have played a part in DB plan termina-
tions that took the form of conversions to ‘cash
balance’ (CB) plans (D’Souza et al., 2008). A CB
plan is technically a DB plan with certain charac-
teristics common to a DC plan. The Bank of
America introduced one of the first CB plans in
1985, claiming that it saved them $75m in a single
year (D’Souza et al., 2008: 5). Conversions to CB
plans became controversial, leading to congres-
sional hearings on the subject in 1999 and again in
2003. Under a CB plan, the employer makes a con-
tribution to an account held for each employee and
interest is added each year on the balance of the
account. Although a CB plan might appear to be
similar to a DC plan, in that longevity risk is trans-
ferred from the employer to the employee, it dif-
fers in that the investment risk continues to be
borne by the employer (Elliott and Moore, 2000).
An attraction of a CB plan to an employer is that it
provides a means of making an interest rate arbi-
trage gain by investing the plan’s funds in assets
that yield higher rates than the bond rate credited
to the employee’s cash balance account (D’Souza
et al., 2008: 5). Furthermore, a CB plan would be
classified as a DB plan under SFAS 87, and as
such these arbitrage gains would boost reported in-
come, particularly for overfunded plans during the
boom conditions of the late 1990s.14 D’Souza et al.
compared firms which converted their DB plans to
CB plans during the years 1985–2002 with control
samples of firms which terminated their DB plans
and firms which continued their DB plans. The
study reveals that cost reduction is an important
determinant of conversion. The results also indi-
cate that CB conversions were more popular than
DB plan terminations among firms with overfund-
ed plans in periods when expected return on plan
assets is likely to be high, with a consequent posi-
tive effect on reported income.
Beaudoin et al. (2007) examine decisions by
large (S&P 500) firms in the period 2001–2006 to
stop accruing DB benefits for some or all employ-
ees (i.e. to ‘freeze’ their DB plans). In this period,
pension accounting measurement was still gov-
erned by SFAS 87. Beaudoin et al. find that the
more underfunded the plans and the greater the re-
ported pension expense, the more likely the firm is
to freeze the plans. The authors interpret this result
as implying that financial reporting considerations
played a primary role in the freeze decision, the
correlation with pension expense being a conse-
quence of a desire to improve reported perform-
ance and funding status in anticipation of the
reporting that would soon be required under SFAS
158 (FASB, 2006). An alternative explanation
would be that the firms were simply seeking to
limit pension contributions, a motive independent
of financial reporting rules.
It is important to recognise that the decision to
terminate a pension plan depends strongly on the
regulatory environment. While companies might
be troubled by the magnitude of the liabilities they
now have to include on their balance sheets, they
will also be mindful of the costs of getting rid of
them. Since 2003, a UK company that wishes to
‘walk away’ from its DB scheme has to get them
bought out by an insurance company, who will
often price the liability at a much higher figure
260 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
11 These rules were superseded by SFAS 88 (FASB, 1985b),
which required immediate recognition of termination gains.
However, at more or less the same time plan terminations were
made more costly as the Tax Reform Act 1986 imposed excise
taxes of 10% on asset reversions.
12 To the extent that the determination of tax liabilities is af-
fected by financial accounting measurement standards, the fi-
nancial reporting will have real economic consequences.
13 Haw et al. (1991) show that where settlements of over-
funded plans do not involve asset reversions, the objective ap-
pears to be to offset a decline in earnings and to mitigate debt
covenant constraints, suggesting that accounting considera-
tions might have played a role.
14 Moreover, under SFAS 87 the return on plan assets in-
cluded in the calculation of reported pension expense is based
on the expected rather than the actual return; hence fluctua-
tions in the returns continue to be smoothed with CB plans as
they are with DB plans.
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than the FRS 17 amount. The actuarial consultants
Lane Clarke & Peacock (2006) estimate that if all
the FTSE 100 companies chose to do this then the
aggregate shortfall as at mid-July 2005 would have
exceeded £175bn. Firms in the UK are therefore
more likely to seek to freeze DB plans than to
close them.
The rules, regulations and conventions govern-
ing pension provision are complex and vary from
country to country. This has caused considerable
difficulty in the development of a universally ap-
plicable international standard. Existing pension
standards draw a sharp distinction between DB
and DC plans. This has caused particular problems
in The Netherlands where industry-wide multi-em-
ployer DB schemes are commonplace. Prior to
IAS 19, Dutch GAAP allowed companies to treat
these schemes as DC plans on the ground that the
agreement the employers have with the pension
fund is that individual companies are not responsi-
ble for covering funding shortages, although em-
ployer contributions may be increased when such
a shortage occurs. Under IAS 19 such schemes
would be required to be treated as DB plans. A re-
cent development has been the introduction of a
new type of collective pension arrangement that
removes the ambiguity concerning the employers’
collective responsibility for any shortfalls.
Participating companies will continue to offer a
DB scheme to their employees, but in the event of
a deficit the fund’s board will have to decide how
the benefits are to be reduced, thereby making the
schemes sufficiently DC-like to qualify for DC ac-
counting. Swinkels (2006) reports that some Dutch
companies have explicitly attributed the change to
the need to comply with the provisions of IAS 19.
In summary, the role accounting plays in pension
provision decisions is complex and situation 
specific. The decision to terminate, freeze or con-
vert DB plans to some other kind of plan is influ-
enced by numerous factors. It could be argued that
SFAS 87 encouraged the retention of DB plans by
smoothing the impact of period-to-period pension
asset returns on reported net income. The conver-
sion of DB plans to CB plans is consistent with
this proposition in that CB plans retain the report-
ing of asset returns by using the expected rather
than the actual return. The accounting for both DB
and CB plans under SFAS 87 allows sponsoring
firms to have their cake and eat it: by investing
pension funds in risky assets that promise an ex-
pected rate of return greater than the bond rate
used to discount pension liabilities, the firm is able
to book an interest rate arbitrage without having
income affected by the volatility that this strategy
entails. This benefit disappears under SFAS 158 in
the sense that the volatility is recorded in other
comprehensive income.
The evidence we have summarised above sug-
gests that the desire to contain costs has been a
more important determinant of pension provision
than financial reporting considerations, though
that played a part as well.
5. Post-retirement health care benefits
The fact that DB schemes are highly regulated
makes it inherently difficult to pin down the ef-
fects of accounting requirements on pension provi-
sion. A clearer picture emerges if we look at a
related form of retirement provision for employees
that has also caused problems in the US – employ-
er-sponsored retiree health care plans.
More than 50% of Americans receive their
health care insurance through an employer. Costs
of employer-paid insurance have been rising rapid-
ly, much more than wages have increased (Kaiser
Family Foundation, 2007). While in the case of re-
tiree health plans the commitments extend far into
the future, most firms have not pre-funded these
obligations due to lack of tax incentives and legal
requirements to do so. Prior to the introduction of
SFAS 106 (FASB, 1990), the great majority of
firms accounted for the costs of retiree health plans
on a pay-as-you-go basis (Warshawsky, 1992).
SFAS 106 required firms to account for retiree
health care obligations on broadly the same accru-
al accounting basis as they were required to do so
for DB pensions under SFAS 87.
SFAS 106 allowed firms to recognise the exist-
ing unfunded health care liability immediately on
the balance sheet or to spread the recognition over
a period not exceeding 20 years (in which case the
total liability would have to be disclosed in the
notes to the financial statements). Warshawsky 
et al. (1993) estimate that the unfunded liability,
however disclosed, amounted to approximately
6% of the market value of the median firm’s equi-
ty. Reported income in the years immediately after
adoption declined about 5% for firms that recog-
nised the transition liability in full and approxi-
mately 8% for those which delayed recognition
(Warshawsky et al., 1993).
The introduction of SFAS 106 provided a setting
that is largely uncontaminated by regulatory fac-
tors or by tax or other cash flow effects. One way
in which SFAS 106 might have had an impact is in
making managers and investors more aware of the
burden of retiree health care commitments.
Another is that the resultant increase in a firm’s li-
abilities might impose debt-contracting costs
through causing its debt ratio to worsen, thereby
increasing the probability of technical default of its
borrowing agreements. Such factors might be ex-
pected to lead firms to take steps to reduce retiree
health care benefits.
Mittelstaedt et al. (1995) examine the possible
influences of SFAS 106 with a sample of 202 list-
ed US firms that had reported pay-as-you-go post-
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 261
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retirement healthcare costs in 1988 as required
under SFAS 81 (FASB, 1984), which were not in
the utilities and finance industries, and for which
necessary data were available. Seventy-one firms
in this sample reported reducing benefits and 131
did not. Reductions in benefits took a variety of
forms, including capping employer contributions,
increasing employee contributions, and reducing
or eliminating benefits for certain classes of exist-
ing and new employees. As might be expected,
firms that were already highly indebted at the time
of the introduction of SFAS 106 or had weaker 
operating cash flow were more inclined to cut ben-
efits than financially stronger firms. After control-
ling for these factors, Mittelstaedt et al. found that
the bigger the impact of the SFAS 106 liability on
the debt ratio than would have otherwise been re-
ported, the greater the likelihood that the firm
would cut retiree health care benefits.
Generally speaking, any accounting standard
that increases reported expenses will tend to result
in managerial actions designed either to reduce the
costs or to make accrual assumptions that give the
appearance of doing so. Mittelstaedt et al. (1995)
examine how SFAS 106 encouraged cost-reducing
behaviour. Rate-regulated utilities provide an in-
teresting exception to this general rule, for ex-
pense-increasing standards can have a positive
effect on their cash flows to the extent that the
rates they charge are based on their accounting
numbers.15
D’Souza (1998) examines whether the introduc-
tion of SFAS 106 had this effect on electric utility
firms. Her study examines 58 US electric utility
companies that operated in states where rate recov-
ery of accrued SFAS 106 costs was permitted and
for which the necessary data were publicly avail-
able. Exactly half of the sample firms cut benefits
in some way. An interesting feature of D’Souza’s
study is that she simultaneously considers both the
firms’ reporting strategy and whether benefits
were cut in the wake of SFAS 106. She finds that
‘competitively weaker utilities (high-cost produc-
ers with a more price-sensitive customer base) use
more cost-inflating SFAS 106 assumptions, and
show a greater propensity to refrain from retiree
health plan reductions’ (D’Souza, 1998: 389).
However, her results do not indicate that the deci-
sion to cut benefits is influenced by the accounting
impact of SFAS 106. As might be expected, utili-
ties where unions have more bargaining power
were less likely to modify their health care plans.
These findings are broadly consistent with evi-
dence of how the stock market reacted to the expo-
sure draft for SFAS 106. There was generally a
substantial negative stock price reaction, which
Espahbodi et al. (1991) attribute to the likely neg-
ative effect of SFAS 106 on reported debt ratios.
Khurana and Loudder (1994), on the other hand,
show that this did not apply to rate-regulated utili-
ties. For these firms, the share price reaction to the
exposure draft varied, depending on the market’s
expectations of whether the regulators would
adopt SFAS 106 for rate-setting purposes.
To summarise, we can glean clearer insights into
the impact of accounting requirements in the case
of post-retirement health care benefits than we can
with DB pensions because the influence of other
factors can be more readily pinned down.
Furthermore, this picture is not complicated by
funding considerations because health care bene-
fits are almost always wholly unfunded. SFAS 106
had some effect, largely through the increase in
debt ratios. We therefore turn next to consider
whether changes in pension accounting rules have
affected pension asset allocations.
6. Pension asset allocations
British pension funds invest approximately 60% of
their assets in equities (Pensions Regulator, 2007:
19).16 Sponsoring employers benefited greatly
from the long bull market in the 1990s as a direct
consequence of following this strategy. Caution
would indicate that such firms ought to have cho-
sen to overfund their schemes on the principle that
what goes up might later come down. However,
the surplus on the winding-up of a DB plan may,
in certain circumstances, be returned to the em-
ployer, subject to tax at 35%. For this and other
reasons, the reaction of many British companies
was dramatically to reduce, and in some cases
cease altogether, their contributions to their DB
schemes. All this took place during the time when
SSAP 24 was in force. As a result, for a consider-
able period of time, DB plans appeared relatively
cheap for employers. All the greater was the shock
when deficits appeared and contribution rates had
to be increased.
We noted in Section 3 the concern that the re-
quirement in FRS 17 to discount pension liabilities
using an AA-bond rate might lead firms to tilt pen-
sion fund asset allocations strongly in favour of
fixed interest securities, regardless of whether this
is an optimal economic policy. Indeed, a number
of major UK companies have, for whatever reason,
done just this. Perhaps the most striking example
of this was the decision of the retailer Boots plc in
2001 to move all the assets in its DB scheme,
three-quarters of which had previously been in-
vested in equities, into bonds. Overall, there has
been a general tendency to disinvest from equities.
Nevertheless, firms’ pension asset portfolios re-
main highly sensitive to market conditions. Some
indication of this can be obtained by the gyrations
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15 Utilities were excluded from Mittelstaedt et al. (1995) for
this very reason.
16 The proportion is less in larger and better-funded schemes.
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in the aggregate FTSE 100 pension deficits and
surpluses in recent years. Lane Clark & Peacock
(2008) calculate that these have varied from a high
of a £12bn surplus in mid-July 2007 to a deficit of
£41bn at the same point in 2008.
A substantial amount of research exists on the
influence of factors such as employee demograph-
ics, tax, regulation and corporate financial policy
on pension asset allocations. The amount of re-
search dealing with the possible influence of ac-
counting on pension asset allocation is much more
limited. Amir and Benartzi (1999) address the
question of whether the recognition of additional
minimum pension liability on the balance sheets of
US companies in accordance with SFAS 87 influ-
enced asset allocations. SFAS 87 required the dis-
closure of pension assets and liabilities in
footnotes to the financial statements. In addition,
any deficit over and beyond that already accrued
had to be recognised as ‘additional minimum pen-
sion liability’. In other words, recognition was
asymmetrical, deficits appearing on the balance
sheet and surpluses revealed only in footnotes.17
The likelihood of a firm with a fully funded plan
having to recognise a deficit depends on the extent
to which the pension assets hedge the pension lia-
bilities. Using a proprietary mark-to-market data-
base, Amir and Benartzi (1999) find that
companies which are close to the recognition
threshold are more likely to invest in fixed-income
securities than in equities.18 Their results also sug-
gest that firms’ choice of pension investments ap-
pears to be motivated by a desire to reduce the
volatility of pension contributions. In other words,
both financial management and financial reporting
factors appear to have played a part in US pension
asset allocations.
A new study by Amir et al. (2007) turns the spot-
light on the UK, examining whether new pension
disclosures and pension recognition rules specified
in FRS 17 and IAS 19 affected pension asset allo-
cations of British companies. FRS 17 revealed the
degree of volatility in firms’ DB plans, with sur-
pluses being disclosed in one year only to turn into
deficits in the following year, and vice versa. Prior
to 2005, firms had the option of just revealing this
information in the notes to the financial state-
ments; afterwards, they had to recognise the
amounts in the balance sheet and book any gains
and losses immediately in the statement of total
recognised gains and losses. Amir et al. (2007)
label the former the ‘disclosure period’ (from fis-
cal 2000 to one year prior to recognition under
FRS 17 or IAS 19) and the latter the ‘full recogni-
tion period’. Shifts in pension portfolio composi-
tion could, of course, take place for reasons
unconnected with pension accounting. An interest-
ing feature of the Amir et al. (2007) study is that it
attempts to control for such differences by com-
paring shifts in the UK and the US during these
two periods. In the US there was a ‘partial recog-
nition period’ running from fiscal 2000 to
November 2006 and a full recognition period from
one year prior to adoption of SFAS 158 until the
year of adoption in fiscal 2006. The logic of com-
paring the two countries is that US firms have been
required to provide footnote disclosure of pension
asset and liability amounts under SFAS 87 since
1986, and are therefore less likely to be motivated
to make portfolio adjustments by accounting con-
siderations during these periods than are their
British counterparts.
Amir et al. (2007) find that UK companies did
indeed shift pension assets from equities to bonds
during the disclosure period, whereas US compa-
nies maintained a relatively stable allocation of eq-
uities and bonds. British companies also shifted
from equities to bonds during the full recognition
period, and the shift was more pronounced for
firms where the negative impact of full recognition
was expected to be stronger. US companies also
shifted funds from equities to bonds during the
SFAS 158 full recognition period, although the
shifts were smaller than those made by their
British counterparts.
Mashruwala (2007) also finds that the introduc-
tion of FRS 17 was associated with a switch of
pension assets from equities to bonds. This study
found that the magnitude of the switch depended
on the likely financial reporting effects of FRS 17.
The switch to bonds was greater in firms where the
effect of FRS 17 would be to increase reported
gearing and greater in firms facing higher expected
volatility of future actuarial gains and losses. A
constraining factor is that pension asset returns can
be ‘managed’ via the expected return accrual used
in the computation of FRS 17 pension expense, a
flexibility that is diminished the greater the propor-
tion of pension assets that are invested in bonds.
Consistent with this earnings management hypoth-
esis, Mashruwala (2007) finds that firms for which
the effect of FRS 17 on reported pension expense is
greatest do not reduce their equity allocation.
Germany provides an interesting setting for con-
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 263
17 This asymmetry could be rationalised on economic
grounds if the firm’s obligations are firm but its rights to pen-
sion surpluses are restricted. As noted previously, pension sur-
pluses in the US have often been used by the firm to pay for
cost-of-living adjustments to its pensioners. And indeed there
have been bitter disputes with unions over attempts by firms
to claw back pension surpluses. However, the legal right of the
employer to such surpluses was established by a regulatory
decision in 1984 if certain stringent conditions were met
(Thomas, 1989: 365). Landsman (1986) shows that share
prices behave as if pension assets and liabilities are effective-
ly assets and liabilities of the firm, a finding consistent with
investors viewing both pension surpluses and deficits as being
part of the firm’s net assets.
18 For a critical assessment of this interpretation of the re-
sults, see Lilien (1999).
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sidering how pension accounting can affect pen-
sion allocations. Traditionally, DB plans in
Germany are unfunded, taking the form of corpo-
rate promises that are backed by a public pension
benefit guarantee association in the event of corpo-
rate bankruptcy which is funded by annual insur-
ance fees paid by the sponsoring companies.
German companies have not faced pressures or in-
centives to fund their DB plans: there are no regu-
lations requiring that they be funded and any
payments into a fund are not tax deductible.19
Lobe and Stadler (2008) show how this has been
affected by the growing number of German com-
panies which since 1998 have been voluntarily
preparing their consolidated financial statements
in accordance with either international or US ac-
counting standards rather than German GAAP
prior to this becoming mandatory in 2005. An un-
funded DB pension obligation computed under
German GAAP would have been significantly
lower than it would have been under IAS 19, SFAS
87 or SFAS 158. However, while it was uncom-
mon for firms to create an external fund of pension
assets, if they did so they were generally required
under German GAAP to include the pension assets
and liabilities separately on a gross basis on the
balance sheet, rather than net them off against each
other.20 Adoption of either international or US
GAAP therefore had two offsetting effects: on the
one hand, their reported pension obligations were
increased and, on the other hand, these were 
reduced if they had pension assets which could 
be netted against this amount. Lobe and Stadler
(2008) outline the various ways that German com-
panies now fund their pension obligations so as to
permit them to exploit this netting-off opportunity.
They also show that the likelihood of a firm choos-
ing to fund their pension obligations is greater, the
more years it has used international pension ac-
counting standards instead of German GAAP.
In summary, research carried out to date sup-
ports the proposition that pension accounting re-
quirements have affected pension asset allocations.
Whether this has been a good or bad thing is diffi-
cult to judge. Concern that has been expressed
about shifts in asset allocation from equities to
bonds implicitly assumes that pension schemes
should optimally allocate a substantial proportion
of their funds to equities. The counterview is that
investing in equities is only optimal for overfund-
ed schemes (Bodie, 1990). The issue remains an
open one.
7. Concluding remarks
DB pensions are complex contractual arrange-
ments and determining accounting measurements
that will properly inform investors of their eco-
nomic implications is far from straightforward.
Early efforts in this direction allowed firms to fol-
low traditional actuarial practice of ‘taking a long
view’ by smoothing out the underlying volatility of
pension returns and costs. This changed with the
introduction of FRS 17. The fear has been ex-
pressed that this and any subsequent changes in
pension accounting will result in employers either
cutting back on DB pension provision or drive
them to adopt sub-optimal pension asset allocation
strategies.
Our review of the research literature reveals the
following:
1. Decisions to freeze, terminate or convert DB
plans have been driven primarily by a desire to
limit contributions, though financial reporting
has played a part as well.
2. The introduction of accrual accounting require-
ments for post-retirement health care benefits
in the US similar in character to those required
for DB pension liabilities would appear to have
motivated some firms to curtail health care pro-
vision.
3. Changes in accounting for DB schemes have
affected how firms allocate pension plan assets.
We conclude that accounting matters, though
perhaps not as much as is sometimes claimed.
Increased costs of providing DB pensions caused
by increases in life expectancy, the withdrawal of
pension funds’ tax credit on dividend income and
tighter prudential regulations, coupled with the
greater volatility of employers’ cash contributions,
have undoubtedly played the major part in the de-
cline of DB schemes.
A recurring theme of many criticisms made of
the new pension standards is that figures are being
included in the financial statements that convey lit-
tle useful information about the long-term costs of
providing DB pensions. As a result, firms will
make sub-optimal pension provision decisions
driven by short-term reporting considerations. The
problem with this argument is best summed up in
Keynes’s remark that in the long run we are all
dead. Companies fail and are taken over. Even
household names in seemingly stable industries
disappear. Pension regulators are no longer content
simply to hope that everything will come right in
the end, and neither are accounting standard set-
ters. Determination of an appropriate rate for dis-
counting such liabilities is a complex matter
(arguably, the most appropriate rate to use would
be that which would be applied by an insurance
company in a buyout). Mark-to-market gains and
264 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
19 For a detailed discussion of the various historical, legal
and fiscal influences on patterns of pension provision in dif-
ferent countries, see Davis (1995).
20 As we have already noted, the ASB/EFRAG discussion
paper (ASB, 2008) raises the question of whether pension as-
sets and liabilities should be recognised on a gross rather than
net basis.
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losses on pension assets are no less real just be-
cause pension trustees decide not to cash them out.
A proper consideration of whether current pen-
sion accounting requirements are the best way of
informing investors of the impact of a firm’s DB
schemes on its financial position, performance and
prospects is beyond the scope of the present paper.
Regardless of how the core data are calculated and
presented, we would argue that investors need also
to be given supplementary information that will
enable them to understand the inherent uncertain-
ties involved in pension commitments that stretch
far into the future (Blake et al., 2008).21 It would
seem only sensible that if companies decide they
cannot live with their earnings and financial posi-
tion being subjected to substantial pension shocks,
then they should indeed protect their businesses by
shifting pension assets out of equities into bonds or
cutting back on DB provision. This is what the ev-
idence we have reviewed suggests they are doing.
It is hard to argue that DB schemes should be kept
in existence if this can only be done by keeping 
investors and creditors in the dark about the risks
involved.
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